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1. INNOVATIVE CLAIMS 
As a contrast to prior work and as shown in the red 
area in the picture to the right, we propose an 
Instruction-Set Architecture (ISA) and associated 
processor hardware design which implements an 
Inscrutable ISA (I2SA).  An I2SA operates on non-
standard numbers such that the data are 
inscrutable or nearly impossible to fully recover 
with possession only of the hardware chips 
implementing an I2SA programmed with some 
application(s).  In short, we examine secure 
computing where a microprocessor reads, writes and 
executes operations ideally in an inscrutable domain.  The goal is to provide methods and 
implementations for computation where data never leave the inscrutable domain in which they 
reside; the intended effect is twofold.  The first intended effect is that any transmissions between 
computing media using our approach would be unbreakable in any reasonable amount of time; 
i.e., intercepted instructions and/or data would be meaningless to the unauthorized interceptor.  
The second intended effect is that, as a result of embedded computing platforms realized using 
inscrutable computing elements, any loss of equipment utilizing such computing hardware would 
not be very meaningful to the recoverer: we refer to this as loss tolerance.  In other words, if the 
computing hardware – and associated instructions, data and microchips – were to fall into hostile 
hands, no data could be fully understood (all bits uncovered) in a reasonable amount of time 
(e.g., less than one year).  Furthermore, we also investigate degrees of inscrutability where 




Shown on the previous page is a juxtaposition of research proposed here versus 
“traditional” security research regarding processors and ISA.  Traditional security processor and 
ISA research to date has focused on providing protections and encryption support for bus, 
network and memory contents and traffic.  However, in all prior research, encrypted data must be 
unencrypted to plain, standard text (i.e., typical Boolean numbers implemented with 
straightforward bit patterns such as two’s complement for number representation) prior to 
execution with the ISA. 
We realize such loss-tolerant computing using an Instruction-Set Architecture (ISA) we 
call an Inscrutable ISA (I2SA).  To our knowledge, we are the first such group to ever investigate 
this approach. 
2. EXAMPLE SCENARIO AND DOMAIN IMPACT 
Consider the following embedded computing scenario as an example.  Wireless 
transmission hardware shown to the right is placed in the theatre.  This hardware 
receives, transmits and generates data. 
To further clarify the situation, assume that the wireless transmission hardware 
is unmanned and falls into malicious hands with all microchips fully functional.  The result is that 
engineers in hostile territory end up with all chips in hand. 
Now consider this scenario with current state-of-the-art encrypted buses, memory and 
network traffic.  Let us assume the best of published state-of-the-art; thus, decryption is not 
performed on a separate coprocessor chip but instead is inside the single microprocessor chip.  
Furthermore, various hardware protections have been added to make sections of memory 
readable only by certain software processes with proper keys.  Unfortunately, known techniques 
(such as electrical signal monitoring, power analysis, differential fault analysis and reverse 
engineering) can potentially read the hardware logic, thereby uncovering how the internal 
hardware carries out decryption, including any keys stored in internal register locations.  Given 
this information, the memory can be decrypted and all bits recovered. 
As an alternative, take all of the above plus one additional fact: the microprocessor uses an 
I2SA.  If the hardware were to fall into malicious hands, the hardware logic could potentially be 
reverse engineered.  However, the raw data and instructions operate in an inscrutable domain.  
Even with expensive large-scale equipment for reverse engineering available, say, to a nation-
state, nonetheless the hostile engineering staff have an additional complicating factor: all 












could be recovered in any reasonable amount of time (say, less than a year) is essentially zero.   
3. TECHNICAL APPROACH 
To the right is shown increasing levels of use of 
encrypted data.  At the outermost level are network 
traffic and external, separate memory chips.  Also, 
in the outermost level are separate decryption chips 
which take incoming encrypted data and output 
unencrypted data.  Recent work has maintained 
data in encrypted format in parts of on-chip memory 
and on-chip buses (on the microprocessor chip 
itself).  This is shown to the right in the blue-green 
middle circle.  At the innermost circle in red to the 
right, the processor ISA is shown the processor ISA 
with the associated microarchitecture.  Currently, all prior work known to the authors implements 
the ISA in an unencrypted microarchitecture, namely, everything in the red circle is non-
inscrutable.  As a result, none of the processor hardware implementing the assembly instructions 
operates on anything other than unencrypted, raw data. 
To approximate an inscrutable ISA we 
shrink the red inner circle shown above.  For 
example, we could consider operating on 
encrypted instructions except for branch 
instructions.  For a branch instruction alone, we 
would unencrypt in order to execute the branch.  
The result is shown on the right where the red 
(unencrypted) domain of operation is much 
smaller.   
Homomorphisms 
In one interpretation, the problem of 
realizing a fully inscrutable ISA (or I2SA) is intimately related to that of homomorphic encryption 
schemes.  While such schemes are sufficient for our needs, it is not at all evident that they are 
necessary.  Much of our effort along the foundational domain in the context of realizing I2SA has 
been devoted to innovating “weaker” notions of realizations than those required either by 













following the rigorous characterizations based on semantic security.  Clearly, an auxiliary goal 
will be to understand the feasibility of realizing such systems where the notion of weakness, 
relative to a fixed ISA, will be quantified.  Finally, based on these foundations, an analysis of the 
I2SA frameworks innovated can reconcile the quality of security afforded by them against the 
theoretically feasible limits. 
4. TARGET ENVIRONMENT 
To demonstrate feasibility, we port the I2SA to a well known compiler infrastructure, Trimaran.  
Trimaran is in use worldwide with over 30 sites active (e.g., publishing results and dissertations 
using Trimaran).  Furthermore, the Center for Research on Embedded Systems and Technology 
(CREST) at Georgia Tech has an active and vibrant research program in customization of 
embedded systems.  Research performed at CREST is leveraged in this research, especially for 
power modeling, analysis and optimization for design of the I2SA embedded processor. 
 We evaluate the research along three dimensions: speed, energy and increase in 
security.  As a baseline case, we consider a microprocessor with the same attributes (chip 
technology, sizes of memories, etc.) running the same applications.  Thus, reported simulation 
results comparing metrics for instructions per second, instructions per Joule, and increase in 
security should always have a baseline case so that clear and precise quantitative statements 
can be made. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we propose an Instruction-Set Architecture (ISA) and associated processor 
hardware design which implements an Inscrutable ISA (I2SA).  An I2SA operates on non-
standard numbers such that the data are inscrutable or nearly impossible to fully recover with 
possession only of the hardware chips implementing an I2SA programmed with some 
application(s).  In short, we examine secure computing where a microprocessor reads, writes 
and executes operations ideally in an inscrutable domain.  The goal is to provide methods and 
implementations for computation where data never leave the inscrutable domain in which they 
reside.  Finally, we also investigate degrees of inscrutability where portions of the data are 
inscrutable and other portions are not inscrutable. 
